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Abstract
Governments around the world are trying to build large data registries for effective delivery of a variety
of public services. However, these efforts are often undermined due to serious concerns over privacy risks
associated with collection and processing of personally identifiable information. While a rich set of special-
purpose privacy-preserving techniques exist in computer science, they are unable to provide end-to-end
protection in alignment with legal principles in the absence of an overarching operational architecture to
ensure purpose limitation and protection against insider attacks. This either leads to weak privacy protection
in large designs, or adoption of overly defensive strategies to protect privacy by compromising on utility.
In this paper, we present an operational architecture for privacy-by-design based on independent reg-
ulatory oversight stipulated by most data protection regimes, regulated access control, purpose limitation
and data minimisation. We briefly discuss the feasibility of implementing our architecture based on existing
techniques. We also present some sample case studies of privacy-preserving design sketches of challenging
public service applications.
1 Introduction
A welfare state may have legitimate interests in building large data registries with personally identifiable in-
formation (PII) for efficiency of service delivery. A state may also legitimately need to put its residents under
purpose-specific surveillance. In fact, several commentators have alluded to the possibility of pervasive under-
the-skin surveillance in a post-COVID world [1]. However, mandatory recordings of PII require enacting rea-
sonable and fair laws to ensure that the processing of PII is proportionate to the stated objective, and safeguard
the basic operative principles of privacy and fairness. Citizens’ basic rights need to be protected even when
there is a legitimate state interest in digitisation with PII [2]. The need to ensure that the information collected
is not used adversely against citizens to harm them takes us into one of the hard problems of modern public
policy: creating rules and technologies around information privacy to help strike this critical balance for online
collection of PII at national scale.
In this paper we address the problem of operationalising the broad privacy-by-design principles outlined in
[3, 4], in the context of large public service databases. We present an architecture for implementing the data
protection principles after the utility and proportionality of an application have been established through an
appropriate regulatory analysis [5, 6, 7].
The general principles of fair and reasonable processing, purpose, collection and storage limitation, notice
and consent, data quality etc. have evolved since the 1970s, both through sector specific standards in the US
such as the Social Security Number Protection Act [8] and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [9], or through omnibus laws in general data protection standards such as the GDPR in the European
Union [6] and the Draft Data Protection Bill of India [7]. However, they have largely failed to prevent both
direct harms that can occur as a result of data breaches or through unauthorised access of personal data -
such as identity thefts, unethical profiling and unlawful surveillance, or secondary harms that could arise due
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to the use of the data to adversely affect a person - such as through discrimination or exclusion, predatory
targeting for unsuitable products, loss of employment, inaccurate credit rating etc. Dictums such as personal
data shall be processed in a fair and reasonable manner are non-specific, and they do not adequately define the
contours of the required regulatory actions. As episodes like Cambridge Analytica [10] demonstrate, harm is
often not immediately obvious, and causal links of harm are not always easy to determine. This is compounded
by the fact that data collection and use are becoming ubiquitous making it hard to trace misuse; the effects of
misuse of personal data may not immediately manifest, and when they do they may not be easily quantifiable in
monetary terms despite causing grave distress. Hence, ex-post accountability and punitive measures are largely
ineffective, and it is imperative to operationalise ex-ante preventive principles.
As a consequence of the weak protection standards, most attempts at building large public services like
national identity systems [11, 12], health registries [13, 14, 15], national population and voter registries [16, 17,
18], public credit registries [19, 20], income [21] and tax registries [22] etc. have often been questioned on privacy
and fairness grounds and have been difficult to operationalise. The concerns have invariably been related to the
need for protective safeguards when large national data integration projects are contemplated by governments
and acknowledgment of the unprecedented surveillance power that this could create. In some situations they
have even had to be abandoned altogether as they were unable to deal with these risks [13, 14, 23]. In India
too, the recent momentum and concerns around informational privacy guarantees have occurred in the context
of the creation of new government databases and digital infrastructures for welfare delivery [24, 25].
1.1 Requirements for privacy protection
Recording transactions with PII projects an individual into a data space, and any subsequent loss of privacy
can happen only through the data pathway. Hence data protection is central to privacy protection insofar as
databases are concerned. The critical challenge in design of a data protection framework is that the main uses of
digitisation - long term record keeping and data analysis - are seemingly contradictory to the privacy protection
requirements. The legal principles around “fair information practice” attempt to reconcile these tensions, but
there are four broad areas that require careful attention for effective data protection.
1.1.1 Use cases and data minimisation
First, a data protection framework is incomplete without an investigation of the nuances of digital identity, and
guidelines for the various use cases of authentication, authorisation and accounting. It is also incomplete without
an analysis of the extent to which personal information needs to be revealed for each use case, for example during
know-your-citizen or -customer (KYC) processes. In addition, effective protection requires an understanding
of the possible pathways of information leaks; of the limits of anonymisation with provable guarantees against
re-identification attacks [26]; and of the various possibilities with virtual identities [27, 28].
1.1.2 Access control and purpose limitation
Second, there have to be clear-cut guidelines for defining the requirements and standards of access control, and
protection against both external and insider attacks in large data establishments, technically as well as legally.
In particular, insider attacks are the biggest threat to privacy in public databases [12]. These include possible
unauthorised and surreptitious examination of data, transaction records, logs and audit trails by personnel
with access, leading to profiling and surveillance of targeted groups and individuals, perhaps at the behest of
interested and influential parties in the state machinery itself [29]. Thus, there must be guidelines on how the
data may be accessed, under what authorisation and for what purpose. In addition, post data access purpose
limitation - ensuring that there is no illegal use after the data crosses the access boundaries - is also crucial for
privacy protection.
1.1.3 Inferential privacy and purpose limitation
Third, a data protection framework is incomplete without guidelines for safe use of AI and data analytics.
Most theories for improving state efficiency in delivery of welfare and health services using personal data will
have to consider improved data processing methods for targeting, epidemiology, econometrics, tax compliance,
corruption control, analytics, topic discovery, etc. This, in turn, will require digitisation, surveillance and
processing of large-scale personal transactional data. This requires detailed analyses of how purpose limitation
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of such surveillance - targeted towards improving efficiency of the state’s service delivery - may be achieved
without enabling undesirable mass surveillance that may threaten civil liberty and democracy. There must also
be effective guidelines to prevent discriminatory and biased data processing [30].
1.1.4 Regulatory oversight
Finally, it is well recognised in data protection frameworks [5, 6, 7] that regulatory oversight is a necessary
requirement for ensuring the above.
1.2 Our contribution
While there is a rich set of tools and techniques in computer science arising out of decades of innovative privacy
research, there is no overarching general framework for a privacy preserving architecture which, in particular,
allows regulatory supervision and helps deal with the above issues in effective designs. In this paper we propose
such an operational architecture for implementing the data protection principles. Our immediate objective here
is design space exploration and not specific implementations to evaluate performance and scalability.
We illustrate the effectiveness of our proposal through design sketches of some challenging large public service
applications. In particular, we illustrate through some real world case studies how some state-of-the-art designs
either fail in their data protection goals, or tend to be overly defensive at the cost of utility in the absence of
such an architecture.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the basic legal principles for data
protection. Section 3 reviews concepts, tools and techniques from computer science for privacy protection.
Section 4 presents our operational architecture. Section 5 discusses the feasibility and Section 6 discusses some
illustrative case studies of large government applications.
2 The India context and privacy and data protection concepts in
law and regulation
In what follows we briefly discuss the context of digitisation and privacy in India and the basic legal principles
around privacy. We situate this analysis within the context of India’s evolving regulatory and technical systems.
However, many of these principles are relevant for any country seeking to align legal and technical guarantees
of privacy for citizens.
2.1 Public digital infrastructures and informational privacy in India
Building public digital infrastructures has received an impetus in India in recent times [31] and privacy has
been an obvious concern. India has a long-standing legal discourse on privacy as a right rooted in the country’s
Constitution. However, informational privacy and data protection issues have gained renewed visibility due to
the recent national debate around the country’s Aadhaar system [24]. Aadhaar is a unique, biometric-based
identity system launched in 2009, with the ambitious aim of enrolling all Indian residents, and recording their
personal information, biometric fingerprints and iris scans against a unique identity number. Aadhaar was
designed as a solution for preventing leakages in government welfare delivery and targeting public services
through this identity system. In addition, the “India stack” was envisioned as a set of APIs that could be
used - by public and private sector entities contract - to query the Aadhaar database to provide a variety of
services [32]. However, as the project was unrolled across the country, its constitutionality was challenged in
the courts on many grounds including the main substantive charge that it was violative of the citizens’ right to
privacy. Over 30 petitions challenging the system were eventually raised to the Supreme Court of India for its
final determination. In the course of the matter, a more foundational question arose, i.e., whether the Indian
Constitution contemplated a fundamental right of privacy? The question was referred to a separate 9-judge
bench of the Indian Supreme Court to conclusively determine the answer to this question. The answer to this
question is important both for law and computer science, since the response creates deep implications for the
design of technical systems in India. The Supreme Court’s unanimous response to this question in Justice
K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs Union of India (Puttaswamy I) [2] was to hold that privacy is a fundamental right
in India guaranteed by Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Indian Constitution. Informational privacy was
noted to be an important aspect of privacy for each individual, that required protection and security. In doing
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so, the Court recognised the interest of an individual in controlling or limiting the access to their personal
information, especially as ubiquitous data generation and collection, combined with data processing techniques,
can derive information about individuals that we may not intend to disclose.
2.2 Defining informational privacy
In addition to cementing privacy as a constitutional right for Indians, the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy I [2]
also played an important role in clarifying certain definitional aspects of the concept.
First, when defining privacy, the lead judgement noted that every person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
has both subjective and objective elements (see page 246 of Puttaswamy I), i.e.,
1. the subjective element which is to the expectation and desire of an individual to be left alone, and
2. the objective element, which refers to objective criteria and rules (flowing from constitutional values) that
create the widely agreed content of “the protected zone”, where a person ought to be left alone in our
society.
Second, informational privacy was also recognised (see page 201 of Puttaswamy I, from a seminal work which
set out a typology of privacy) to be:
“. . . an interest in preventing information about the self from being disseminated and controlling the
extent of access to information.”
It would be the role of a future Indian data protection law to create some objective standards for informa-
tional privacy to give all actors in society an understanding of the “ground rules” for accessing an individuals’
personal information. These principles are already fairly well-developed through several decades of international
experience. India is one of the few remaining countries in the world that is yet to adopt a comprehensive data
protection framework. This section provides a brief overview of some of these established concepts.
2.3 Data protection principles
One of the early and most influential global frameworks on privacy protection are the 1980 OECD Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data [4]. These were formulated as a response
to the advancements in technology that enabled faster processing of large amounts of data as well as their
transmission across different countries. These Guidelines were updated in 2013, reflecting the multilateral
consensus of the changes in the use and processing of personal data in that 30 year period. Therefore, it is a
good starting point for the fundamental principles of privacy and data protection.
The key principles of the OECD Privacy Framework 2013 are:
Collection Limitation: Personal data should be collected in a fair and lawful manner and there should be
limits to its collection.
Use Limitation: Collected personal data be used or disclosed for any purposes other than those stated. If
personal data must be used for purposes other that those stated, it should with the consent of the data
subject or with the authority of the law.
Purpose Specification: The purpose for collection of personal data should be stated no later than the point
of collection. All subsequent uses of such data must be limited to the stated purposes.
Data Quality: Collected personal data should be relevant for the stated purposes and its accuracy for such a
purpose must be maintained.
Security Safeguards: Reasonable safeguards must be adopted by the data controller to protect it from risks
such as unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of the data.
Accountability: Any entity processing personal data must be responsible and held accountable for giving
effect to the principles of data protection and privacy.
Openness: Any entity processing personal data must be transparent about the developments and practices
with respect to the personal data collected.
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Individual Participation: Individuals should have the rights to confirm from the data controller whether
they have any personal data relating to them and be able to obtain the same within a reasonable time, at
a reasonable charge and in a reasonable manner. If these requests are denied, individuals must be given
the reasons for such denial and have the right to challenge such denials. Individuals must also retain
the right to be able to challenge personal data relating to them and able to erase, rectify, complete or
amended.
These principles, and many international instruments and national laws that draw from them, set some of the
basic ground rules around the need for clear and legitimate purposes to be identified prior to accessing personal
information. They also stress on the need for accountable data practices including strict access controls. Many
of these principles are reflected to varying degrees in India’s Personal Data Protection Bill in 2019 [7] which
was introduced in the Lower House of the Indian Parliament in December 2019. The Bill is currently under
consideration by a Joint Select Committee of Parliamentarians following which it will enter Parliament for final
passage.
The OECD Privacy Framework 2013 [4] in Article 19(g) also recognised the need for the promotion of
technical measures to protect privacy in practice. There is also a growing recognition that if technical systems
are not built with an appreciation of data protection and privacy principles, they can create deficits of trust
and other dysfunctions. These are particularly problematic in government-led infrastructures.
2.4 The failure of privacy self-management and the need for accountability-based
data protection
The need for data processing entities to adhere to objective and enforceable standards of data protection is
heightened because of vulnerability of the individuals whose data they process. Although research shows that
individuals value their privacy and seek to control how information about them is shared, cognitive limitations
operate at the level of the individuals’ decision-making about their personal data [5]. This “Privacy Paradox”
signals the behavioural biases and information asymmetries that operate on people making decisions about
sharing their personal information. Especially in contexts where awareness that personal data is even being
collected in digital interactions is low, such as with first-time users of digital services in India, it is often unfair
and meaningless to delegate the self-management of privacy to users entirely through the ineffective mechanism
of “consent”. The inadequacy of consent alone as a privacy protection instrument has been well established,
especially given that failing to consent to data collection could result in a denial of the service being sought by
the user [5].
In the context of these findings, it is crucial that digital ecosystems be designed in a manner that protects
the privacy of individuals, does not erode their trust in the data collecting institution and does not make them
vulnerable to different natures of harm. Therefore, mere dependence on compliance with legal frameworks by
data controllers is not sufficient. Technical guarantees that the collected data will only be used for the stated
purposes and in furtherance of data protection principles must become a reality, if these legal guarantees are to
be meaningful. The need for early alignment of legal and technical design principles of data systems, such as
access controls, purpose limitation and clear liability frameworks under appropriate regulatory jurisdictions are
essential to create secure and trustworthy public data infrastructures [5, 6, 7].
3 Privacy concepts in computer science
Before we present our architectural framework, we briefly review some privacy preserving tools from computer
science.
3.1 Encryption, signatures and cryptographic hashes
3.1.1 Encryption
Cryptographic encryption [33], for protecting data either in storage or transit, have often been advocated for
privacy protection. The following types are of particular importance:
Symmetric encryption Symmetric encryption allows two parties to encrypt and decrypt messages using a
shared secret key. Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [34] is commonly used by the parties to jointly
establish a shared key over an insecure channel.
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Asymmetric encryption Asymmetric or public key encryption [34] allows two parties to communicate with-
out the need to exchange any keys beforehand. Each party holds a pair of public and private keys such
that messages encrypted using the receiver’s public key cannot be decrypted without the knowledge of the
corresponding private key.
ID-based encryption ID-based encryption [35] allows the sender to encrypt the message against a textual
ID instead of a public key. A trusted third party provisions decryption keys corresponding to the IDs
of potential receivers after authenticating them through an out-of-band mechanism. ID-based encryption
considerably simplifies the public key infrastructure: a sender can encrypt messages using the semantic
identifier of the intended recipient without explicitly knowing the public keys of the particular receivers.
Encryption with strong keys is a powerful method for privacy protection provided there are no unauthorised
accesses to the keys. Insider attacks, however, pose serious risks if the keys also reside with the same authority.
Even when the keys are stored securely, they have to be brought into the memory for decryption during run-time,
and can be leaked by a compromised privileged software, for example an operating system or a hypervisor.
3.1.2 Signatures
Digital signature A digital signature [34] σpk(m) on a message m allows a verifier to verify using the public
key pk that m was indeed signed with the corresponding the private key. Any alteration of m invalidates
the signature. Signatures also provide non-repudiation.
Blind signatures Blind signatures [36] are useful to obtain a signature on a message without exposing the
contents of the message to the signer. A signature σ′pk(b(m)) by a signer holding public key pk allows the
signer to sign a blinded message b(m) that does not reveal anything about m. The author of the message
can now use the σ′pk(b(m)) to create an unblinded digital signature σpk(m).
3.1.3 Cryptographic hash function (CHF)
CHFs are functions that are a) ‘one-way’, i.e., given hash value h, it is difficult to find an x such that h = hash(x),
and b) ‘collision-resistant’, i.e., finding any x1 and x2 such that hash(x1) = hash(x2) is difficult. CHFs form
the basis of many privacy preserving cryptographic primitives.
3.2 Data minimisation
There are several techniques from computer science that are particularly useful for data minimisation - at
different levels of collection, authentication, KYC, storage and dissemination. Some of these are:
3.2.1 Zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) and selective disclosures
ZKPs [37] are proofs that allow a party to prove to another that a statement is true, without leaking any
information other than the statement itself. Of particular relevance are ZKPs of knowledge [38], which convince
a verifier that the prover knows a secret without revealing it. ZKPs also enable selective disclosure [39], i.e.,
individuals can prove only purpose-specific attributes about their identity without revealing additional details;
for example, that one is of legal drinking age without revealing the age itself.
3.2.2 Anonymity and anonymous credentials
“Anonymity refers to the state of being not identifiable within a set of individuals, the anonymity set” [40]. In
the context of individuals making transactions with an organisation, the following notions of anonymity can be
defined:
Unlinkable anonymity Transactions provide unlinkable anonymity (or simply unlinkability) if a) they do not
reveal the true identities of the individuals to organisations, and b) organisations cannot identify how
different transactions map to the individuals.
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Linkable anonymity Transactions provide linkable anonymity if an organisation can identify whether or not
two of its transactions involve the same individual, but individuals’ true identities remain hidden. Linkable
anonymity is useful because it allows individuals to maintain their privacy while allowing the organisation
to aggregate multiple transactions from the same individual. Linkable anonymity is typically achieved by
making individuals use pseudonyms.
Anonymous credentials Authenticating individuals online may require them to provide credentials from
a credential-granting organisation A to a credential-verifying organisation B. Privacy protection using
anonymous credentials [41, 28, 27] can ensure that transactions with A are unlinkable to transactions with
B. Anonymous credentials allow an individual to obtain a credential from an organisation A against their
pseudonym with A and transform it to an identical credential against their pseudonym with organisation
B. An identity authority provisions a master identity to each individual from which all pseudonyms
belonging to an individual, also known as virtual identities, are cryptographically derived. Anonymous
credentials are typically implemented by obtaining blind signatures (see Section 3.1.2) from the issuer and
using ZKPs of knowledge (see Section 3.2.1) of these signatures to authenticate with the verifier. The
credential mechanism guarantees:
• Unlinkable anonymity across organisations. This property ensures that A cannot track the uses of
the issued credentials and B cannot obtain the individual’s information shared only with A even
when A and B collude.
• Unforgeability. A credential against an individual’s pseudonym cannot be generated without obtain-
ing an identical credential against another pseudonym belonging to the same individual.
• Linkable anonymity within an organisation. Depending on the use case requirements, individuals
may or may not use more than one pseudonym per organisation. In the latter case the transactions
within an organisation also become unlinkable.
If an organisation A requires to link multiple transactions from the same individual, it can indicate this
requirement to the identity authority that checks if pseudonyms used by individuals with A are unique.
If A does not require linking, the identity authority merely checks if the pseudonyms are correctly derived
from the individual’s master identity. If the checks pass, an anonymous credential certifying this fact is
issued by the identity authority. All checks by the identity authority preserve individuals’ anonymity.
Accountable anonymous credentials Anonymity comes with a price in terms of accountability: individuals
can misuse their credentials if they can never be identified and held responsible for their actions. Trusted
third parties can revoke the anonymity of misbehaving users to initiate punitive measures against them
[42, 43, 44]. One-time credentials and k-times anonymous authentication schemes [45, 46, 47] also prevent
overspending of limited-use credentials by revoking individuals’ anonymity if they overspend. Blacklisting
misbehaving users for future access without revoking their anonymity is also feasible [48].
Linkability by a trusted authority Linking across organisations may also be required for legitimate pur-
poses, for example for legitimate data mining. Also see examples in Section 5. Such linkability also seems
to be an inevitable requirement to deter sharing of anonymous credentials among individuals [49]. Link-
ability by a trusted authority can be trivially achieved by individuals attaching a randomised encryption
of a unique identifier against the trusted authority’s public key for transactions requiring cross-linking.
Of course, appropriate mechanisms must exist to ensure that the trusted authority does not violate the
legitimate purpose of linking.
Note that the anonymity of credentials is preserved only under the assumption that individuals interact with
organisations through anonymous channels (e.g., in [42]). In particular, neither the communication network nor
the data that individuals share with organisations should be usable to link their transactions (see Section 3.2.3
and 3.2.4).
3.2.3 Anonymous networks
Anonymous networks, originally conceptualised as mix networks by Chaum [50], are routing protocols that
make messages hard-to-trace. Mix networks consist of a series of proxy servers where each of them receives
messages from multiple senders, shuffles them, and sends to the next proxy server. An onion-like encryption
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scheme allows each proxy server to only see an encrypted copy of the message (and the next hop in plaintext),
thus providing untraceability to the sender even if only one proxy server honestly shuffles its incoming messages.
3.2.4 Database anonymisation
Anonymisation is the process of transforming a database such that individuals’ data cannot be traced back to
them. However, research in de-anonymisation has shown that anonymisation does not work in practice, as small
number of data points about individuals coming from various sources, none uniquely identifying, can completely
identify them when combined together [26]. This is backed by theoretical results [51, 52] which show that for
high-dimensional data, anonymisation is not possible unless the amount of noise introduced is so large that it
renders the database useless. There are several reports in literature of de-anonymisation attacks on anonymised
social-network data [53, 54], location data [55], writing style [56], web browsing data [57], etc.
3.2.5 Interactive database anonymisation
In this setting, analysts interact with a remote server only through a restricted set of queries and the server
responds with possibly noisy answers to them. Dinur and Nissim [58] show that given a database with n rows,
an adversary having no prior knowledge could make O(n polylog(n)) random subset-sum queries to reconstruct
almost the entire database, unless the server perturbs its answers too much (by at least O(
√
n)). This means
that preventing inference attacks is impossible if the adversary is allowed to make arbitrary (small) number
of queries. Determining whether a given set of queries preserves privacy against such attacks is in general
intractable (NP-hard) [59].
3.3 Inferential and differential privacy
3.3.1 Inferential privacy
Inferential privacy [60, 61] is the notion that no information about an individual should be learnable with access
to a database that could not be learnt without any such access. In a series of important results [58, 62, 63], it was
established that such an absolute privacy goal is impossible to achieve if the adversary has access to arbitrary
auxiliary information. More importantly, it was observed that individuals’ inferential privacy is violated even
when they do not participate in the database, because information about them could be leaked by correlated
information of other participating individuals.
3.3.2 Differential privacy
In the wake of the above results, the notion of differential privacy was developed [63] to allow analysts extract
meaningful distributional information from statistical databases while minimising the additional privacy risk
that each individual incurs by participating in the database. Note that differential privacy is a considerably
weaker notion than inferential privacy as reconstruction attacks described in Section 3.2.5 or other correlation
attacks can infer a lot of non-identifying information from differentially private databases too.
Mechanisms for differential privacy add noise to the answers depending on the sensitivity of the query.
In this sense, there is an inherent utility versus privacy tradeoff. Differentially private mechanisms possess
composability properties. Thus, privacy degrades gracefully when multiple queries are made to differentially
private databases. However, this alone may not protect against an attacker making an arbitrary number of
queries. For example, the reconstruction attacks mentioned in Section 3.2.5 prevent many differentially private
algorithms from answering a linear (in the number of rows) number of queries [64]. For specific types of queries
though, e.g., predicate queries, sophisticated noise-addition techniques [65] can be used to maintain differential
privacy while allowing for an exponential number of queries [64, 66].
3.3.3 Group and societal privacy
Differentially private mechanisms also degrade gracefully with respect to group privacy as the group size in-
creases. These guarantees may not be enough for policymakers who must protect the profile of specific com-
munities constituting a sizable proportion of the population. The ability of an adversary to manipulate and
influence a community even without explicitly identifying its members is deeply problematic, as demonstrated
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by episodes like Cambridge Analytica [10]. Therefore, the goal of modern private data analysis should not be
limited to protecting only individual privacy, but also extend to protecting sensitive aggregate information.
3.3.4 A note on non-statistical databases
Due to the inherently noisy nature of differentially private mechanisms, they are not suitable for any non-
statistical uses, e.g., financial transactions, electronic health records, and password management. Privacy
mechanisms for such use-cases must prevent misuse of data for malicious purposes such as illegal surveillance
or manipulation, without hampering the legitimate workflows.
The difficulties with differential privacy, and the impossibility of protection against inferential privacy vio-
lations, suggest that privacy protection demands that there should be no illegal access or processing in the first
place.
3.4 Purpose limitation
3.4.1 Program analysis techniques
These check whether a given code-base uses personal data in accordance with a given privacy policy [67, 68, 69].
Privacy policies are expressed in known formal languages [70, 71]. A compiler verifies, using standard information
flow analysis [72] and model-checking techniques [73], if a candidate program satisfies the intended privacy policy.
In order to enforce various information flow constraints these techniques rely on manual and often tedious tagging
of variables, functions and users with security classes and verify if information does not flow from items with
high security classes to items with low security classes.
3.4.2 Purpose-based access control
These techniques define purpose hierarchies and specify purpose-based access-control mechanisms [74, 75, 76].
However, they typically identify purpose with the role of the data requester and therefore offer weak protection
from individuals claiming wrong purposes for their queries.
3.4.3 Formalisation of purpose
Jafari et al. [77] formalise purpose as a relationship between actions in an action graph. Hayati et al. [69] express
purpose as a security class (termed by them as a “principal”) and verify that data collected for a given purpose
does not flow to functions tagged with a different purpose. Tschantz et al. [78] state that purpose violation
happens if an action is redundant in a plan that maximises the expected satisfaction of the allowed purpose.
However, enforcement of these models still relies on fine-grained tagging of code blocks, making them tedious,
and either a compiler-based verification or post-facto auditing, making them susceptible to insider attacks that
bypass the checks.
3.5 Secure remote execution
Secure remote execution refers to the set of techniques wherein a client can outsource a computation to a remote
party such that the remote party does not learn anything about the client’s inputs or intermediate results.
3.5.1 Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes compute in the ciphertext space of encrypted data by relying on the
additive or multiplicative homomorphism of the underlying encryption scheme [79, 80, 81]. Designing an encryp-
tion scheme that is both - which is required for universality - is challenging. Gentry [82] gave the first theoretical
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. Even though state-of-the-art FHE schemes and implementations
have considerably improved upon Gentry’s original scheme, the performance of these schemes is still far from
any practical deployment [83]. Functional encryption (FE) [84] schemes have similar objectives, with the crucial
difference that FE schemes let the remote party learn the output of the computation, whereas FHE schemes
compute encrypted output, which is decrypted by the client.
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3.5.2 Secure multiparty computation
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) - originally pioneered by Yao through his garbled circuits technique [85]
- allows multiple parties to compute a function of their private inputs such that no party learns about others’
private inputs, other than what the function’s output reveals. SMC requires clients to express the function to
be computed as an encrypted circuit and send it to the server alongwith encrypted inputs; the server needs
to evaluate the circuit by performing repeated decryptions of the encrypted gates. As a result, SMC poses
many challenges in its widespread adoption - ranging from the inefficiencies introduced by the circuit model
itself to the decryption overhead for each gate evaluation, even as optimisations over the last two decades have
considerably improved the performance and usability of SMC [86].
However, HE, FE and SMC based schemes involve significant application re-engineering and may offer
reduced functionality in practice.
3.6 Hardware-based security
In recent times, secure remote execution is increasingly being realised not through advances in cryptography
but through advances in hardware-based security. This approach commoditises privacy-preserving computation,
albeit at the expense of a weakened trust model, i.e., the increased trust on the hardware manufacturer.
3.6.1 Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [87] implements access control in the CPU to provide confidentiality
and integrity to the executing program. At the heart of the SGX architecture lies the notion of an isolated
execution environment, called an enclave. An enclave resides in the memory space of an untrusted application
process but access to the enclave memory and leakage from it are protected by the hardware. The following are
the main properties of SGX:
Confidentiality Information about an enclave execution can not leak outside the enclave memory except
through explicit exit points.
Integrity Information can not leak into the enclave to tamper with its execution except through explicit entry
points.
Remote attestation For an enclave’s execution to be trusted by a remote party, it needs to be convinced
that a) the contents of the enclave memory at initialisation are as per its expectations, and b) that
confidentiality and integrity guarantees will be enforced by the hardware throughout its execution. For
this the hardware computes a measurement, essentially a hash of the contents of the enclave memory and
possibly additional user data, signs it and sends it over to the remote party [88]. The remote party verifies
the signature and matches the enclave measurement with the measurement of a golden enclave it considers
secure. If these checks pass, the remote party trusts the enclave and sends sensitive inputs to it.
Secure provisioning of keys and data SGX enclaves have secure access to hardware random number gen-
erators. Therefore, they can generate a Diffie-Hellman public/private key pair and keep the private key
secured within enclave memory. Additionally, the generated public key can be included as part of addi-
tional user data in the hardware measurement sent to a remote verifier during remote attestation. These
properties allow the remote verifier to establish a secure TLS communication channel with the enclave over
which any decryption keys or sensitive data can be sent. The receiving enclave can also seal the secrets
once obtained for long-term use such that it can access them even across reboots, but other programs or
enclaves cannot.
3.6.2 Other hardware security mechanisms
SGX has been preceded by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [89]. TPM defines a hardware-based root of
trust, which measures and attests the entire software stack, including the BIOS, the OS and the applications,
resulting in a huge trusted computing base (TCB) as compared to SGX whose TCB includes only the enclave
code. ARM Trustzone [90] partitions the system into a secure and an insecure world and controls interactions
between the two. In this way, Trustzone provides a single enclave, whereas SGX supports multiple enclaves.
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Trustzone has penetrated the mobile world through ARM-based Android devices, whereas SGX is available for
laptops, desktops and servers.
SGX is known to be susceptible to serious side-channel attacks [91, 92, 93, 94]. Sanctum [95] has been pro-
posed as a simpler alternative that provides provable protection against memory access-pattern based software
side-channel attacks. For a detailed review on hardware-based security, we refer the reader to [86].
3.7 Secure databases
Stateful secure remote execution requires a secure database and mechanisms that protect clients’ privacy when
they perform queries on them.
3.7.1 Querying encrypted databases
The aim of these schemes is to let clients host their data encrypted in an untrusted server and still be able to
execute queries on it with minimal privacy loss and maximal query expressiveness. One approach for enabling
this is searchable encryption schemes, i.e., encryption schemes that allow searching over ciphertexts [96, 97].
Another approach is to add searchable indexes along with encrypted data, or to use special property-preserving
encryptions to help with searching [98, 99, 100, 101]. However, both approaches are susceptible to inference
attacks [102, 103, 104, 105] (cf. Sections 3.2.4, 3.2.5 and 3.3.1). Oblivious RAM [106, 107] is a useful primitive
that provides read/write access to encrypted memory while hiding all access patterns, but these schemes require
polylogarithmic number of rounds (in the size of the database) per read/write request.
EnclaveDB [108] has been recently proposed as a solution based on Intel SGX. It hosts the entire database
within secure enclave memory, with a secure checkpoint-based logging and recovery mechanism for durabil-
ity, thus providing complete confidentiality and integrity from the untrusted server without any loss in query
expressiveness.
3.7.2 Private information retrieval
Private information retrieval (PIR) is concerned with hiding which database rows a given user query touches
- thus protecting user intent - rather than encrypting the database itself. Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [109]
demonstrated a PIR scheme with communication complexity O(n), for any  > 0, using the hardness of the
quadratic residuosity problem. Since then, the field has grown considerably and modern PIR schemes boast
of O(1) communication complexity [110]. Symmetric PIR (also known as oblivious transfer), i.e., the set of
schemes where additionally users cannot learn anything beyond the row they requested, is also an active area
of research.
4 Operationalisation using trusted executables and regulatory ar-
chitecture
As is evident from the discussion in the previous section, none of the techniques by themselves are adequate
for privacy protection. In particular, none are effective against determined insider attacks without regulatory
oversight. Hence we need an overarching architectural framework based on regulatory control over data minimi-
sation, authorisation, access control and purpose limitation. In addition, since the privacy and fairness impacts
of modern AI techniques [30] are impossible to determine automatically, the regulatory scrutiny of data pro-
cessing programs must have a best effort manual component. Once approved, the architecture must prevent
any alteration or purpose extension without regulatory checks.
In what follows we present an operational architecture for privacy-by-design. We assume that all databases
and the associated computing environments are under physical control of the data controllers, and the online
regulator has no direct physical access to it. We also assume that the data controllers and the regulators do not
collude.
We illustrate our conceptual design through an example of a privacy-preserving electronic health record
(EHR) system. EHRs can improve quality of healthcare significantly by providing improved access to patient
records to doctors, epidemiologists and policymakers. However, the privacy concerns with them are many,
ranging from the social and psychological harms caused by unwanted exposure of individuals’ sensitive medical
information, to direct and indirect economic harms caused by the linkage of their medical data with data
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Figure 1: An illustration of the architecture of trusted executables using an example involving an EHR database, a
patient, an MRI imaging station, a doctor and a data analysis station. TEs marked “APPROVED BY R” are pre-
audited and pre-approved by the regulator R. ER(·) represents a regulator-controlled encryption function and ACR
represents online access control by regulator R. DTi(x) represent various data types parametrised by the patient x
(as explained in the right-hand side table). In particular, V irtualHospitalID(x) represents the hospital-specific virtual
identity of the patient. The regulator checks the consents, approvals and other static rules regarding data transfer at
each stage of online access control.
presented to their employers, insurance companies or social security agencies. Building effective EHRs while
minimising privacy risks is a long standing design challenge.
4.1 Trusted executables
We propose trusted executables (TE) as the fundamental building blocks for privacy-by-design. We introduce
them in the abstract, and discuss some possibilities for their actual realisation in Section 5. TEs are data-
processing programs, with explicit input and output channels, that are designed by the data controllers but
are examined, audited, and approved by appropriate regulators. TEs execute in controlled environments on
predetermined data types with prior privacy risk assessment, under online regulatory access control. The
environment ensures that only approved TEs can operate on data items. In particular, all data accesses from
the databases, and all data/digest outputs for human consumption, can only happen through the TEs. We
prescribe the following main properties of the TEs:
1. Runtime environment : TEs are approved by regulators. They execute in the physical infrastructure of
the data controllers but cannot be modified by them.
2. Authentication: A regulator can authenticate related TEs during runtime, and verify that indeed the
approved versions are running.
3. Integrity : There is no way for a malicious human or machine agent, or even for the data controller, to
tamper with the execution of a TE other than by sending data through the TE’s explicit input channels.
4. Confidentiality : There is no way for any entity to learn anything about the execution of a TE other than
by reading data written at the TE’s explicit output channels. All data accesses and output can only
happen through TEs.
Besides, all TEs should be publicly available for scrutiny. The above properties allow a regulator to ensure that
a TE is untampered and will conform to the limited purpose identified at the approval stage.
As depicted in Figure 1, a data agent - for example, a hospital - interacts with databases or users only
through pre-approved TEs, and direct accesses are prevented. All data stores and communication messages
are encrypted using a regulator-controlled encryption scheme to prevent any information leakage in transit or
storage. The data can be decrypted only inside the TEs under regulated access control. The regulator provisions
decryption keys securely to the TE to enable decryption after access is granted. The regulator allows or denies
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Figure 2: The regulatory architecture.
Figure 3: An example control flow diagram depicting the regulatory architecture. x0 and y0 represent virtual identities
of the patient and the doctor, respectively. σx0(·) represents digital signature by patient x0. authTE(·) represents
authentication information of the TE and authDT (·) represents authentication information of the supplied data’s type.
Individuals are authenticated by verifying their virtual identities.
access, online, based on the authentication of the TE and the incoming data type, consent and approval checks
as required, and the credential authentication of any human consumers of output data (e.g., the doctor(s) and
data analysts). All sink TEs - i.e., those that output data directly for consumption by a human agent - are
pre-audited to employ appropriate data minimisation before sending data to their output channels. Note that
extending the TE architecture to the doctors’ terminals and the imaging stations ensures that the data never
crosses the regulated boundary and thus enables purpose limitation.
In the above example an independent identity authority issues credentials and engages in a three-way com-
munication to authenticate individuals who present their virtual identities to the regulator. An individual can
use a master Health id to generate hospital-specific or doctor-specific unlinkable anonymous credentials. Only
a health authority may be allowed to link identities across hospitals and doctors in a purpose-limited way under
regulated access control.
4.2 Regulatory architecture
We depict the regulatory architecture in Figure 2. The first obligation of the regulator is to audit and approve
the TEs designed by the data controllers. During this process, the regulator must assess the legality of the
data access and processing requirements of each TE, along with the privacy risk assessment of its input and
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output data types. In case a TE is an AI based data analytics program, it is also an obligation of the regulator
to assess its fairness and the potential risks of discrimination [30]. Before approving a TE, the regulator also
needs to verify that the TE invokes a callback to the regulator’s online interface before accessing a data item
and supplies appropriate authentication information, and that it employs appropriate encryption and data
minimisation mechanisms at its output channels. Finally, the regulator needs to put in place a mechanism to
be able to authenticate the TE in the data controller’s runtime environment.
The second obligation of the regulator is to play an online role in authorising data accesses by the TEs.
The authorisation architecture has both a static and a dynamic component. The static authorisation rules
typically capture the relatively stable regulatory requirements, and the dynamic component typically captures
the fast-changing online context, mainly due to consents and approvals. Specifically, each static authorisation
rule takes the form of a set of pre-conditions necessary to grant access to a TE the data of a given type; and, in
case of sink TEs, to output it to a requester. The design of these rules is governed by regulatory requirements
and the privacy risk assessment of TEs and data types. The rules are typically parametric in nature, allowing
specification of constraints that provide access to a requester only if the requester can demonstrate some specific
relationship with the data individual (e.g., to express that only a doctor consulted by a patient can access her
data).
The pre-conditions of the authorisation rules may be based on consent of data individuals, approvals by
authorities or even other dynamic constraints (e.g., time-bound permissions). The consent architecture must
be responsible for verifying signatures on standardised consent APIs from consent givers and recording them
as logical consent predicates. The regulator, when designing its authorisation rules, may use a simple consent -
for example, that a patient has wilfully consulted a doctor - to invoke a set of rules to protect the individual’s
privacy under a legal framework, rather than requiring individuals to self-manage their privacy.
Similar to the consent architecture, the approval architecture for data access must record standardised
approvals from authorities as logical approval predicates. An approval from an authority may also be provided
to an individual instead of directly to the regulator, as a blind signature against a virtual identity of the
individual known to the approver, which should be transformed by the individual to a signature against the
virtual identity known to the data controller and the regulator. This, for example, may enable a patient to
present a self generated virtual identity to a doctor or a hospital instead of her universal Health id.
The regulator also requires an authentication architecture. First, it needs to authenticate individuals, i.e.,
consent givers, approvers and data requesters, by engaging in a three-way communication with an identity
authority which may be external to both the data controller and the regulator. Second, it needs to authenticate
TEs in order to be able identify the access requests as originating from one of the pre-approved TEs. Third, it
needs to authenticate data types, i.e., identify the underlying type of the TE’s encrypted input data.
The consent/approval predicates and the authentication information flow to the dynamic authorisation mod-
ule, which can instantiate the static authorisation rules with the obtained contextual information to determine,
in an online fashion, if access should be allowed to the requesting TE. If yes, then it must also provision decryp-
tion keys to the TE securely such that only the TE can decrypt. The keys can be securely provisioned to the
TE because of the authentication, integrity and confidentiality properties, and by the fact that approved TEs
must never output the obtained decryption keys.
An example control-flow diagram depicting the regulatory access control in a scenario where a doctor is
trying to access the data of a patient who consulted them is shown in Figure 3.
5 Discussion on feasibility
Several existing techniques can be useful for the proposed architecture, though some techniques may need
strengthening.
Trusted executables can be implemented most directly on top of trusted hardware primitives such as
Intel SGX or ARM Trustzone where authentication of TEs is carried out by remote attestation. Secure
provisioning of keys and data to TEs can be done in case of Intel SGX as per Section 3.6.1. However, since
SGX includes only the CPU in its TCB, it presents challenges in porting AI applications that run on GPUs for
efficiency. Graviton [111] has been recently proposed as an efficient hardware architecture for trusted execution
environments on GPUs.
In our architecture, TEs fetch or update information from encrypted databases. This may be implemented
using special indexing data structures, or may involve search over encrypted data, where the TEs act as clients
and the database storage acts as the server. Accordingly, techniques from Section 3.7 can be used. Since the
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TEs never output data to agents unless deemed legitimate by the regulator, the inferential attacks identified
with these schemes in Section 3.7 have minimal impact. For added security, EnclaveDB [108], which keeps the
entire database in secure enclave memory, can be used. EnclaveDB has been evaluated on standard database
benchmarks TPC-C [112] and TATP [113] with promising results.
For authentication of data types messages may be encrypted using an ID-based encryption scheme, where
the concrete runtime type of the message acts as the textual ID and the regulator acts as the trusted third party
(see Section 3.1.1). The receiver TE can send the expected plaintext type to the regulator as part of its access
request. The regulator should provision the decryption key for the ID representing the requested type only if
the receiver TE is authorised to receive it as per the dynamic authorisation check. Note that authentication of
the received data type is implicit here, as a TE sending a different data type in its access request can still not
decrypt the incoming data.
Data minimisation for consents and approvals based on virtual identities is well-established from
Chaum’s original works [28, 41]. Individuals should use their purpose-specific virtual identities with organisa-
tions, as opposed to a unique master identity. To prevent cross-linking of identities, anonymous credentials
may be used. In some cases, individuals’ different virtual identities may need to be linked by a cen-
tral authority to facilitate data analytics or inter-organisation transactions. This should be done under strict
regulatory access control and purpose limitation.
Modern type systems can conveniently express the complex parametric constraints in the rules in the au-
thorisation architecture. Efficient type-checkers and logic engines exist that could perform the dynamic
authorisation checks.
Approval of TEs needs to be largely manual as the regulator needs to evaluate the legitimacy and privacy
risks associated with the proposed data collection and processing activity. However, techniques from program
analysis may help with specific algorithmic tasks, such as checking if the submitted programs adhere to the
structural requirement of encrypting data items with the right type at their outgoing channels.
We require the regulatory boundary to be extended even to agent machines, which must also run
TEs so that data they obtain is not repurposed for something else. However, when a TE at an authorised
agent’s machine outputs data, it could be intercepted by malicious programs on the agent’s machine leading to
purpose violation. Solutions from the DRM literature may be used to prevent this. In particular, approaches
that directly encrypt data for display devices may be useful [114]. We note that this still does not protect the
receiving agent from using more sophisticated mechanisms to copy data (e.g., by recording the display using
an external device). However, violations of this kind are largely manual in nature and ill-suited for large-scale
automated attacks.
Finally, we need internal processes at the regulatory authority itself to ensure that its actual oper-
ational code protects the various decryption keys and provides access to TEs as per the approved policies. To
this end, the regulator code may itself be put under a TE and authenticated by the regulatory authority using
remote attestation. Once authenticated, a master secret key may be provisioned to it using which the rest of
the cryptosystem may bootstrap.
6 Additional case studies
In this section, we present two additional case studies to showcase the applicability of our architecture in diverse
real-world scenarios.
6.1 Direct Benefit Transfer
Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) [115] is a Government of India scheme to transfer subsidies to citizens’ bank
accounts under various welfare schemes. Its primary objective is to bring transparency and reduce leakages in
public fund disbursal. The scheme design is based on India’s online national digital identity system Aadhaar
[24]. All DBT recipients have their Aadhaar IDs linked to their bank accounts to receive benefits.
Figure 4 shows a simplified schematic of the scheme that exists today [116]. A ministry official initiates
payment by generating a payment file detailing the Aadhaar IDs of the DBT recipients, the welfare schemes
under which payments are being made and the amounts to be transferred. The payment file is then signed
and sent to a centralised platform called the Public Financial Management System (PFMS). PFMS hosts the
details of various DBT schemes and is thus able to initiate an inter-bank fund transfer from the bank account
of the sponsoring scheme to the bank account of the beneficiary, via the centralised payments facilitator NPCI
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Figure 4: A simplified schematic of direct benefit transfer as it exists today.
Figure 5: Our proposal for privacy-preserving direct benefit transfer. vidi0 and vid
′
i0 represent i0’s DBT-specific and
Bank-specific virtual identities, respectively. Dashed arrows represent one-time onboarding steps. R1, R3, R2 and R4
represent a DBT regulator, a centralised financial regulator, and internal regulators of the sponsoring and the beneficiary
banks, respectively.
(National Payments Corporation of India). NPCI maintains a mapping of citizen’s Aadhaar IDs to the banks
hosting their DBT accounts. This mapping allows NPCI to route the payment request for a given Aadhaar ID
to the right beneficiary bank. The beneficiary bank internally maintains a mapping of its customers’ Aadhaar
IDs to their bank account details, and is thus able to transfer money to the right account.
As DBT payments are primarily directed towards people who need benefits, precisely because they are struc-
turally disadvantaged, their DBT status must be protected from future employers, law enforcement, financial
providers etc., to mitigate discrimination and other socio-economic harms coming their way. Further, since
DBT relies on the recipients’ national Aadhaar IDs, which are typically linked with various other databases,
any leakage of this information makes them directly vulnerable. Indeed, there are reports that bank and address
details of millions of DBT recipients were leaked online [117]; in some cases this information was misused to
even redirect DBT payments to unauthorised bank accounts [118].
We illustrate our approach for a privacy-preserving DBT in Figure 5. In our proposal, DBT recipients use
a virtual identity for DBT that is completely unlinkable to the virtual identity they use for their bank account.
They may generate these virtual identities - using suitably designed simple and intuitive interfaces - by an
anonymous credential scheme where the credentials are issued by a centralised identity authority. Additionally,
they provide the mapping of the two virtual identities, along with the bank name, to the NCPI mapper. This
information is provided encrypted under the control of the financial regulatorR3 such that only the NPCI mapper
TE can access it under R3’s online access control. This mechanism allows the NPCI mapper to convert payment
requests against DBT-specific identities to the target bank-specific identities, while maintaining the mapping
private from all agents. Regulator-controlled encryption of data in transit and storage and the properties of
TEs allow for an overall privacy-preserving DBT pipeline.
Note that data flow is controlled by different regulators along the DBT pipeline, providing a distributed
approach to privacy protection. PFMS is controlled by a DBT regulator; NPCI mapper is controlled by a
financial regulator, and the sponsor and beneficiary banks are controlled by their respective internal regulators.
6.2 Contact tracing
There have been a plethora of attempts recently from all over the world towards electronic app-based contact
tracing for COVID-19 using a combination of GPS and Bluetooth [119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127].
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(a) Collecting spatiotemporal information. A and B come in contact via BLE, as denoted by the dotted
arrows. C does not come in contact with A or B via BLE but is spatially close within a time window, as
per GPS data. vidX represents the virtual identity of agent X; locXi represents X’s i-th recorded location;
timeXi represents its i-th recorded time. tXi represents i-th token generated by X; rXi represents i-th
receipt obtained by X; σX() represents signing by X. Dashed arrows represent one-time registration steps
(illustrated only for C).
(b) Tracing the contacts of infected individuals. A gets infected, as certified by the doctor’s signature σdoc
on A’s virtual identity vidA and medical report reportA. ds and dt respectively represent chosen spatial and
temporal distance functions and  and δ the corresponding thresholds, as per the disease characteristics. ∆
represents the infection window, the time during which A might have remained infectious. timenow represents
the time when the query was executed.
Figure 6: Contact tracing
Even keeping aside the issue of their effectiveness, some serious privacy concerns have been raised about such
apps.
In most of these apps the smartphones exchange anonymous tokens when they are in proximity, and each
phone keeps a record of the sent and received tokens. When an individual is infected - signalled either through
a self declaration or a testing process - the tokens are uploaded to a central service.
There are broadly two approaches to contact tracing:
1. those involving a trusted central authority that can decrypt the tokens and, in turn, alert individuals and
other authorities about potential infection risks [119, 120, 121, 122]. Some of these apps take special care
to not upload any information about individuals who are not infected.
2. those that assume that the central authority is untrusted and use privacy preserving computations on user
phones to alert individuals about their potential risks of infection [123, 124, 125, 126, 127]. The central
service just facilitates access to anonymised sent tokens of infected individuals and cannot itself determine
the infection status of anybody.
The following are the main privacy attacks on contact tracing apps: 1) individuals learning about other
individuals as high-risk spreaders, 2) insiders at the central service learning about individuals classified as high
risk, 3) exposure of social graphs of individuals, and 4) malicious claims by individuals forcing quarantine on
others. See [125] for a vulnerability analysis of some popular approaches.
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The centralised approaches clearly suffer from many of the above privacy risks. While alerting local author-
ities about infection risks is clearly more effective from a public health perspective, to enable them to identify
hotspots and make crucial policy decisions, it is mainly the privacy concerns that sometimes motivate the second
approach. Also, it is well known that location data of individuals can be used to orchestrate de-anonymisation
attacks [55], and hence many of the above approaches adopt the policy of not using geolocation data for contact
tracing despite their obvious usefulness at least in identifying hotspots. In addition, Bluetooth based proximity
sensing - which are isolated communication events over narrow temporal windows between two smartphones -
is ineffective for risk assessment of indirect transmission through contaminated surfaces, where the virus can
survive for long hours or even days. Such risk assessment will require computation of intersection of space-time
volumes of trajectories which will be difficult in a decentralised approach. It appears that the privacy consid-
erations have forced many of these approaches to adopt overly defensive decentralised designs at the cost of
effectiveness.
In contrast, we propose an architecture where governments can collect fine-grained location and proximity
data of citizens, but under regulated access control and purpose limitation. Such a design can support both short-
range peer-to-peer communication technologies such as BLE and GPS based location tracking. Additionally,
centralised computing can support space-time intersections.
In Figure 6, we show the design of a state-mandated contact-tracing app that, in addition to protecting
against the privacy attacks outlined earlier, can also protect against attacks by individuals who may maliciously
try to pose as low-risk on the app, for example to get around restrictions (attack 5).
As before, we require all storage and transit data to be encrypted under a regulator-controlled encryption
scheme, and that they be accessible only to pre-approved TEs. We also require the app to be running as a TE
on the users’ phones (e.g., within a trusted zone on the phone).
We assume that everyone registers with the app using a phone number and a virtual identity unlinkable to
their other identities. Periodically, say after every few minutes, each device records its current GPS location
and time. The tuple made up of the registered virtual identity and the recorded location and time is signed
by the device and encrypted controlled by the regulator, thus creating an ephemeral “token” to be shared with
other nearby devices over BLE. When a token is received from another device, a tuple containing the virtual
identity of self and the incoming token is created, signed and stored in a regulator-controlled encrypted form,
thus creating a “receipt”. Periodically, once every few hours, all locally stored tokens and receipts are uploaded
to a centralised server TE, which stores them under regulated access control as a mapping between registered
virtual identities and all their spatiotemporal coordinates. For all the receipts, the centralised server TE stores
the same location and time for the receiving virtual identity as in the token it received, thus modelling the close
proximity of BLE contacts.
When a person tests positive, they present their virtual identity to a medical personnel who uploads a signed
report certifying the person’s infection status to the centralised server TE. This event allows the centralised
server TE to fetch all the virtual identities whose recorded spatiotemporal coordinates intersects within a certain
threshold, as determined by the disease parameters, with the infected person’s coordinates. As the recorded
(location, time) tuples of any two individuals who come in contact via BLE necessarily collide in our approach,
the virtual identities of all BLE contacts can be identified with high precision. Moreover, virtual identities of
individuals who did not come under contact via BLE but were spatially nearby in a time window as per GPS
data are also identified.
A notifier TE securely obtains the registered phone numbers corresponding to these virtual identities from
the centralised server TE and sends suitably minimised notifications to them, and also perhaps to the local
administration according to local regulations. The collected location data can also be used independently by
epidemiologists and policy makers in aggregate form to help them understand the infection pathways and identify
areas which need more resources.
Note that attack 1 is protected by the encryption of all sent tokens; attacks 2 and 3 are protected by
the properties of TEs and regulatory access control; attack 4 is protected by devices signing their correct
spatiotemporal coordinates against their virtual identity before sending tokens or receipts. Attack 5 is mitigated
by requiring the app to run within a trusted zone on users’ devices, to prevent individuals from not sending
tokens and receipts periodically or sending junk data.
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7 Conclusion
We have presented the design sketch of an operational architecture for privacy-by-design [3] based on regulatory
oversight, regulated access control, purpose limitation and data minimisation. We have established the need
for such an architecture by highlighting limitations in existing approaches and some public service application
designs. We have demonstrated its usefulness with some case studies.
While we have explored the feasibility of our architecture based on existing techniques in computer science,
some of them will definitely require further strengthening. There also needs to be detailed performance and
usability evaluations, especially in the context of large-scale database and AI applications. Techniques to help
a regulator assess the privacy risks of TEs also need to be investigated. These are interesting open problems
that need to be solved to create practical systems for the future with built-in end-to-end privacy protection.
19
References
[1] Y. N. Harari, “Yuval Noah Harari: the world after coronavirus.” https://www.ft.com/content/
19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75, 2020. [Online; posted 20-March-2020].
[2] “K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017): Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012, Supreme Court judgment
dated 24 August.” https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/fundamental-right-to-privacy, 2017.
[Accessed January 9, 2018].
[3] A. Cavoukian, “Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles.” https://www.ipc.on.ca/
wp-content/uploads/resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf, August 2009. Revised: January,
2011.
[4] OECD, “OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transbor-
der Flows of Personal Data.” https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm, 1980. [Online
accessed 12-May-2020].
[5] D. J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology And Privacy In The Information Age. New York, NY, USA:
New York University Press, 2004.
[6] The European Parliament and the Council of European Union, “Regulation (EU) no 2016/679,” 2016.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0679.
[7] Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, “The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019.” https:
//www.prsindia.org/billtrack/personal-data-protection-bill-2019, 2019. [Online accessed 12-
May-2020].
[8] 111th Congress (2009-2010), “Social Security Number Protection Act of 2010.” https://www.congress.
gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/3789, 2010. [Accessed Novenmber 3, 2019].
[9] Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA).” http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/, 1996.
[10] The Guardian, “Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge An-
alytica in major data breach.” https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/
cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election.
[11] The London School of Economics and Political Science, “The Identity Project: An assessment of
the UK Identity Cards Bill and its implications.” http://www.lse.ac.uk/management/research/
identityproject/identityreport.pdf, June 2005.
[12] S. Agrawal, S. Banerjee, and S. Sharma, “Privacy and Security of Aadhaar: A Computer Science Per-
spective,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. Vol. 52, 16 2017.
[13] J. Temperton, “NHS care.data scheme closed after years of controversy.” https://www.wired.co.uk/
article/care-data-nhs-england-closed, 2016. [Online July 6, 2016].
[14] R. N. Charette, “Australians Say No Thanks to Electronic Health Records.” https://spectrum.ieee.
org/riskfactor/computing/it/australians-choosing-to-optout-of-controversial-my-health-record-system,
2018. [Online July 27, 2018].
[15] S. Shrikanth and B. Parkin, “India plan to merge ID with health records raises privacy worries.” https:
//www.ft.com/content/4fbb2334-a864-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04, July 2019. [Online; posted 17-July-
2019].
[16] K. Zetter, “Voter Privacy Is Gone Get Over It.” https://www.wired.com/2008/01/voter-privacy-i/,
2008. [Online January 31, 2008].
[17] M. Pal, “Are citizens compromising their privacy when registering to vote?.” https://gcn.com/
articles/2018/12/11/voting-data-privacy.aspx, 2018. [Online; posted December 11, 2018].
20
[18] P. S. Tripathi, “Concerns over linking Aadhaar to voter ID and social media accounts.” https:
//frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article29407553.ece, September 2019. [Online; posted 27-
Septeber-2019].
[19] epic.org, “Equifax Data Breach.” https://epic.org/privacy/data-breach/equifax/, 2019. [Online
accessed 3-November-2019].
[20] B. Chugh and M. Raghavan, “The RBI’s proposed Public Credit Registry and its implica-
tions for the credit reporting system in India.” https://www.dvara.com/blog/2019/06/18/
the-rbis-proposed-public-credit-registry-and-its-implications-for-the-credit-reporting-system-in-india/,
2019. [Online posted 18-June-2019].
[21] Yle Uutiset, “Launch of Incomes Register dogged by data security concerns.” https://yle.fi/uutiset/
osasto/news/launch_of_incomes_register_dogged_by_data_security_concerns/10576057, 2018.
[Online posted 30-December-2018].
[22] K. Houser and D. Sanders, “The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solution or the End of
Privacy as We Know it?,” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, vol. 19, April 2017.
[23] GOV.UK Press Release, “National identity register destroyed as government
consigns ID card scheme to history.” https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
national-identity-register-destroyed-as-government-consigns-id-card-scheme-to-history,
2011. [Online posted 10-February-2011].
[24] Unique Identification Authority of India, “Aadhaar.” https://uidai.gov.in, 2020. [Accessed May 31,
2020].
[25] R. Khera, Dissent on Aadhaar: Big Data Meets Big Brother. Orient BlackSwan, 2019. Edited volume.
[26] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets,” in Proceedings of
the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’08, (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 111–125, IEEE
Computer Society, 2008.
[27] D. Chaum, “Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete,” Com-
mun. ACM, vol. 28, pp. 1030–1044, Oct. 1985.
[28] D. Chaum, “Showing Credentials Without Identification,” in Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT’
85 (F. Pichler, ed.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 241–244, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1986.
[29] K. Zetter, “NSA Whistleblower: The Ultimate Insider Attack.” https://www.wired.com/2013/06/
nsa-leaker-ultimate-insider/, September 2009.
[30] S. Barocas, M. Hardt, and A. Narayanan, Fairness and Machine Learning. fairmlbook.org, 2019. http:
//www.fairmlbook.org.
[31] N. Verma and S. Dawar, “Digital transformation in the indian government,” Commun. ACM, vol. 62,
p. 5053, Oct. 2019.
[32] V. Raghavan, S. Jain, and P. Varma, “India stack—digital infrastructure as public good,” Commun. ACM,
vol. 62, p. 7681, Oct. 2019.
[33] G. J. Simmons, “Symmetric and asymmetric encryption,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 11, pp. 305–330, Dec.
1979.
[34] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 22, pp. 644–654, November 1976.
[35] D. Boneh and M. K. Franklin, “Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing,” in Proceedings of
the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 01, (Berlin,
Heidelberg), p. 213229, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
21
[36] D. Chaum, “Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments,” in Advances in Cryptology (D. Chaum, R. L.
Rivest, and A. T. Sherman, eds.), (Boston, MA), pp. 199–203, Springer US, 1983.
[37] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, “Proofs That Yield Nothing but Their Validity or All Lan-
guages in NP Have Zero-knowledge Proof Systems,” J. ACM, vol. 38, pp. 690–728, July 1991.
[38] U. Feige and A. Shamir, “Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds,” in Proceedings of
the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO ’89, (Berlin,
Heidelberg), pp. 526–544, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[39] P. Vullers and G. Alpa´r, “Efficient Selective Disclosure on Smart Cards Using Idemix,” in Policies and
Research in Identity Management (S. Fischer-Hu¨bner, E. de Leeuw, and C. Mitchell, eds.), (Berlin, Hei-
delberg), pp. 53–67, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
[40] A. Pfitzmann and M. Hansen, “Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity,
and Identity Management - A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology,” February 2008.
[41] D. Chaum and J.-H. Evertse, “A Secure and Privacy-Protecting Protocol for Transmitting Personal In-
formation Between Organizations,” in Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 86 (A. M. Odlyzko, ed.),
(Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 118–167, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987.
[42] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya, “An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials
with Optional Anonymity Revocation,” in Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2001 (B. Pfitzmann,
ed.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 93–118, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001.
[43] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya, “Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient Revocation of
Anonymous Credentials,” in Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on
Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 02, (Berlin, Heidelberg), p. 6176, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[44] D. Chaum and E. van Heyst, “Group Signatures,” in Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’91 (D. W.
Davies, ed.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 257–265, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991.
[45] I. Teranishi, J. Furukawa, and K. Sako, “k-Times Anonymous Authentication (Extended Abstract),” in
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2004 (P. J. Lee, ed.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 308–322, Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2004.
[46] L. Nguyen and R. Safavi-Naini, “Dynamic k-Times Anonymous Authentication,” in Applied Cryptography
and Network Security (J. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis, and M. Yung, eds.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 318–333,
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
[47] I. Teranishi and K. Sako, “k-Times Anonymous Authentication with a Constant Proving Cost,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 9th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography, PKC06,
(Berlin, Heidelberg), p. 525542, Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[48] P. P. Tsang, M. H. Au, A. Kapadia, and S. W. Smith, “Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials: Blocking
Misbehaving Users without TTPs,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, CCS 07, (New York, NY, USA), p. 7281, Association for Computing Machinery,
2007.
[49] F. Corella, “Credential Sharing: A Pitfall of Anonymous Credentials.” https://pomcor.com/2011/12/
19/credential-sharing-a-pitfall-of-anonymous-credentials/#1. [Blog Post; Online; Accessed
May 24, 2020].
[50] D. L. Chaum, “Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms,” Commun.
ACM, vol. 24, p. 8490, Feb. 1981.
[51] C. C. Aggarwal, “On k-anonymity and the Curse of Dimensionality,” in Proceedings of the 31st Interna-
tional Conference on Very Large Data Bases, VLDB ’05, pp. 901–909, VLDB Endowment, 2005.
[52] A. Datta, D. Sharma, and A. Sinha, “Provable De-anonymization of Large Datasets with Sparse Dimen-
sions,” in Principles of Security and Trust (P. Degano and J. D. Guttman, eds.), (Berlin, Heidelberg),
pp. 229–248, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
22
[53] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing Social Networks,” in Proceedings of the 2009 30th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’09, (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 173–187, IEEE Computer
Society, 2009.
[54] A. Narayanan, E. Shi, and B. I. P. Rubinstein, “Link Prediction by De-anonymization: How We Won the
Kaggle Social Network Challenge.” https://arxiv.org/pdf/1102.4374.pdf, 2011.
[55] Y.-A. de Montjoye, C. A. Hidalgo, M. Verleysen, and V. D. Blondel, “Unique in the Crowd: The privacy
bounds of human mobility,” Scientific Reports, vol. 3, 2013.
[56] A. Narayanan, H. Paskov, N. Z. Gong, J. Bethencourt, E. Stefanov, E. C. R. Shin, and D. Song, “On the
Feasibility of Internet-Scale Author Identification,” in 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pp. 300–314, May 2012.
[57] J. Su, A. Shukla, S. Goel, and A. Narayanan, “De-anonymizing Web Browsing Data with Social Networks,”
in Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW ’17, (Republic and
Canton of Geneva, Switzerland), pp. 1261–1269, International World Wide Web Conferences Steering
Committee, 2017.
[58] I. Dinur and K. Nissim, “Revealing Information While Preserving Privacy,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-
second ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, PODS ’03,
(New York, NY, USA), pp. 202–210, ACM, 2003.
[59] J. Kleinberg, C. Papadimitriou, and P. Raghavan, “Auditing Boolean Attributes,” in Proceedings of the
Nineteenth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, PODS ’00,
(New York, NY, USA), pp. 86–91, ACM, 2000.
[60] T. Dalenius, “Towards a methodology for statistical disclosure control,” Statistik Tidskrift, vol. 15, no. 429-
444, pp. 2–1, 1977.
[61] A. Ghosh and R. Kleinberg, “Inferential Privacy Guarantees for Differentially Private Mechanisms,” in
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2017, January 9-11, 2017, Berkeley,
CA, USA, pp. 9:1–9:3, 2017.
[62] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith, “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data
Analysis,” in Theory of Cryptography (S. Halevi and T. Rabin, eds.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 265–284,
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006.
[63] C. Dwork, “Differential Privacy,” in Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Automata, Lan-
guages and Programming - Volume Part II, ICALP’06, (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 1–12, Springer-Verlag,
2006.
[64] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth, “A Learning Theory Approach to Non-Interactive Database Privacy,”
in Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 08, (New York,
NY, USA), p. 609618, Association for Computing Machinery, 2008.
[65] F. McSherry and K. Talwar, “Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy,” in Proceedings of the 48th An-
nual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 07, (USA), p. 94103, IEEE Computer
Society, 2007.
[66] M. Hardt, K. Ligett, and F. McSherry, “A Simple and Practical Algorithm for Differentially Private Data
Release,” in Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems
- Volume 2, NIPS12, (Red Hook, NY, USA), p. 23392347, Curran Associates Inc., 2012.
[67] S. Sen, S. Guha, A. Datta, S. K. Rajamani, J. Tsai, and J. M. Wing, “Bootstrapping Privacy Compliance
in Big Data Systems,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’14,
(Washington, DC, USA), pp. 327–342, IEEE Computer Society, 2014.
[68] L. Wang, J. P. Near, N. Somani, P. Gao, A. Low, D. Dao, and D. Song, “Data Capsule: A New Paradigm
for Automatic Compliance with Data Privacy Regulations.” https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.00077.pdf,
2019.
23
[69] K. Hayati and M. Abadi, “Language-Based Enforcement of Privacy Policies,” in Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies (D. Martin and A. Serjantov, eds.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 302–313, Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2005.
[70] Paul Ashley and Satoshi Hada and Gnter Karjoth and Calvin Powers and Matthias Schunter, “The
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) - How to Enforce Privacy throughout an Enterprise.”
https://www.w3.org/2003/p3p-ws/pp/ibm3.html, 2003. [Accessed May 31, 2020].
[71] L. F. Cranor, “P3P: Making Privacy Policies More Useful,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 1, p. 5055,
Nov. 2003.
[72] D. E. Denning, “A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow,” Commun. ACM, vol. 19, p. 236243, May
1976.
[73] C. Baier and J.-P. Katoen, Principles of Model Checking (Representation and Mind Series). The MIT
Press, 2008.
[74] R. Agrawal, J. Kiernan, R. Srikant, and Y. Xu, “Hippocratic Databases,” in Proceedings of the 28th
International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, VLDB 02, p. 143154, VLDB Endowment, 2002.
[75] A. Masoumzadeh and J. B. D. Joshi, “PuRBAC: Purpose-Aware Role-Based Access Control,” in On the
Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2008 (R. Meersman and Z. Tari, eds.), (Berlin, Heidelberg),
pp. 1104–1121, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
[76] J.-W. Byun and N. Li, “Purpose based access control for privacy protection in relational database systems,”
The VLDB Journal, vol. 17, pp. 603–619, Jul 2008.
[77] M. Jafari, P. W. Fong, R. Safavi-Naini, K. Barker, and N. P. Sheppard, “Towards Defining Semantic
Foundations for Purpose-Based Privacy Policies,” in Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Data
and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY 11, (New York, NY, USA), p. 213224, Association for
Computing Machinery, 2011.
[78] M. C. Tschantz, A. Datta, and J. M. Wing, “Formalizing and Enforcing Purpose Restrictions in Privacy
Policies,” in 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 176–190, May 2012.
[79] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems,” Commun. ACM, vol. 21, p. 120126, Feb. 1978.
[80] T. El Gamal, “A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms,” in
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in Cryptology, (Berlin, Heidelberg), p. 1018, Springer-Verlag,
1985.
[81] P. Paillier, “Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes,” in Proceedings
of the 17th International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, EURO-
CRYPT99, (Berlin, Heidelberg), p. 223238, Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[82] C. Gentry, “Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using Ideal Lattices,” in Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 09, (New York, NY, USA), p. 169178, Association for
Computing Machinery, 2009.
[83] A. Acar, H. Aksu, A. S. Uluagac, and M. Conti, “A Survey on Homomorphic Encryption Schemes: Theory
and Implementation,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 51, July 2018.
[84] D. Boneh, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Functional Encryption: Definitions and Challenges,” in Theory of
Cryptography (Y. Ishai, ed.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 253–273, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
[85] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for Secure Computations,” in Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, SFCS 82, (USA), p. 160164, IEEE Computer Society, 1982.
[86] J. I. Choi and K. R. B. Butler, “Secure Multiparty Computation and Trusted Hardware: Examining
Adoption Challenges and Opportunities,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2019, p. 1368905,
Apr 2019.
24
[87] F. McKeen, I. Alexandrovich, A. Berenzon, C. V. Rozas, H. Shafi, V. Shanbhogue, and U. R. Savagaonkar,
“Innovative Instructions and Software Model for Isolated Execution,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Interna-
tional Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 13, (New York,
NY, USA), Association for Computing Machinery, 2013.
[88] I. Anati, S. Gueron, S. P. Johnson, and V. R. Scarlata, “Innovative Technology for CPU Based
Attestation and Sealing.” https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/
innovative-technology-for-cpu-based-attestation-and-sealing.html, 2013. [Online; accessed 4-
June-2020].
[89] Trusted Computing Group, “TPM main specification version 1.2: part 1 design principles.” https:
//trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-1-Design-Principles_v1.2_
rev116_01032011.pdf, 2011. [Online; accessed 31-May-2020].
[90] ARM Ltd., “Building a Secure System using TrustZone Technology.” http://infocenter.arm.
com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.prd29-genc-009492c/PRD29-GENC-009492C_trustzone_security_
whitepaper.pdf, 2005-2009. [Online; accessed 31-May-2020].
[91] Y. Xu, W. Cui, and M. Peinado, “Controlled-channel attacks: Deterministic side channels for untrusted
operating systems,” in Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 15, (USA),
p. 640656, IEEE Computer Society, 2015.
[92] M. Schwarz, S. Weiser, D. Gruss, C. Maurice, and S. Mangard, “Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX
to Conceal Cache Attacks.” https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08719.pdf, 2017.
[93] W. Wang, G. Chen, X. Pan, Y. Zhang, X. Wang, V. Bindschaedler, H. Tang, and C. A. Gunter, “Leaky
Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX,” in Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 17, (New York,
NY, USA), p. 24212434, Association for Computing Machinery, 2017.
[94] J. Van Bulck, M. Minkin, O. Weisse, D. Genkin, B. Kasikci, F. Piessens, M. Silberstein, T. F. Wenisch,
Y. Yarom, and R. Strackx, “Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient
out-of-Order Execution,” in Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, SEC18,
(USA), p. 9911008, USENIX Association, 2018.
[95] V. Costan, I. Lebedev, and S. Devadas, “Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software Iso-
lation,” in Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, SEC16, (USA), p. 857874,
USENIX Association, 2016.
[96] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig, “Practical Techniques for Searches on Encrypted Data,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 00, (USA), p. 44, IEEE Computer
Society, 2000.
[97] J. Baek, R. Safavi-Naini, and W. Susilo, “Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search Revisited,” in Pro-
ceeding Sof the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications, Part I, ICCSA
08, (Berlin, Heidelberg), p. 12491259, Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[98] E.-J. Goh, “Secure indexes.” https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/216.pdf, 2004. [Online; accessed 4-June-
2020].
[99] R. Curtmola, J. A. Garay, S. Kamara, and R. Ostrovsky, “Searchable Symmetric Encryption: Improved
Definitions and Efficient Constructions,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2006, p. 210, 2006.
[100] H. Hacigu¨mu¨s¸, B. Iyer, C. Li, and S. Mehrotra, “Executing SQL over Encrypted Data in the Database-
Service-Provider Model,” in Proceedings of the 2002 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Man-
agement of Data, SIGMOD 02, (New York, NY, USA), p. 216227, Association for Computing Machinery,
2002.
25
[101] R. A. Popa, C. M. S. Redfield, N. Zeldovich, and H. Balakrishnan, “CryptDB: Protecting Confidentiality
with Encrypted Query Processing,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating
Systems Principles, SOSP 11, (New York, NY, USA), p. 85100, Association for Computing Machinery,
2011.
[102] M. S. Islam, M. Kuzu, and M. Kantarcioglu, “Access pattern disclosure on searchable encryption: Rami-
fication, attack and mitigation,” in in Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS, 2012.
[103] D. Cash, P. Grubbs, J. Perry, and T. Ristenpart, “Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Searchable Encryption,”
in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS
15, (New York, NY, USA), p. 668679, Association for Computing Machinery, 2015.
[104] Y. Zhang, J. Katz, and C. Papamanthou, “All Your Queries Are Belong to Us: The Power of File-
Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption,” in Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Conference on Security
Symposium, SEC16, (USA), p. 707720, USENIX Association, 2016.
[105] M. Naveed, S. Kamara, and C. V. Wright, “Inference Attacks on Property-Preserving Encrypted
Databases,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS 15, (New York, NY, USA), p. 644655, Association for Computing Machinery, 2015.
[106] R. Ostrovsky, “Efficient Computation on Oblivious RAMs,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 90, (New York, NY, USA), p. 514523, Association for
Computing Machinery, 1990.
[107] O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky, “Software Protection and Simulation on Oblivious RAMs,” J. ACM,
vol. 43, p. 431473, May 1996.
[108] C. Priebe, K. Vaswani, and M. Costa, “EnclaveDB A Secure Database using SGX,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2018, IEEE, May 2018.
[109] E. Kushilevitz and R. Ostrovsky, “Replication is Not Needed: Single Database, Computationally-Private
Information Retrieval,” in Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Sci-
ence, FOCS 97, (USA), p. 364, IEEE Computer Society, 1997.
[110] A. Kiayias, N. Leonardos, H. Lipmaa, K. Pavlyk, and Q. Tang, “Optimal Rate Private Information
Retrieval from Homomorphic Encryption,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, vol. 2015, 06
2015.
[111] S. Volos, K. Vaswani, and R. Bruno, “Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs,” in Proceed-
ings of the 12th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI18, (USA),
p. 681696, USENIX Association, 2018.
[112] TPC, “TPC-C Homepage.” http://www.tpc.org/tpcc/, 2017. [Online; Accessed June 4, 2020].
[113] S. Neuvonen, A. Wolski, M. manner, and V. Raatikka, “Telecom Application Transaction Processing
Benchmark.” http://tatpbenchmark.sourceforge.net, 2017. [Online; Accessed June 4, 2020].
[114] Digital Content Protection LLC, “HDCP Interface Independent Adaptation Specification.” https:
//www.digital-cp.com/sites/default/files/HDCP%20Interface%20Independent%20Adaptation%
20Specification%20Rev2_3.pdf, March 2018. Revision: 2.3.
[115] Government of India, “Direct Benefit Transfer, Government of India.” https://dbtbharat.gov.in, 2020.
[Accessed May 31, 2020].
[116] DBT Mission, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, “Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) Modules for Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT).” https://dbtbharat.gov.in/data/documents/
Standard-Operating-Procedures.pdf. [Online; Accessed April 14, 2020].
26
[117] A. Sinha and S. Kodali, “Information Security Practices of Aadhaar (or lack
thereof): A documentation of public availability of Aadhaar Numbers with sensi-
tive personal financial information.” https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/
information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof-a-documentation-of-public-availability-of-aadhaar-numbers-with-sensitive-personal-financial-information-1.
[Online; Accessed May 19, 2020].
[118] A. Venkatanarayanan and S. Lakshmanan, “Aadhaar Mess: How Airtel Pulled Off Its Rs 190 Crore Magic
Trick.” https://thewire.in/banking/airtel-aadhaar-uidai. [Online; Accessed April 14, 2020].
[119] A. Krishnan, “China’s high-tech battle against COVID-19.” https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/
chinas-high-tech-battle-against-covid-19/article30993814.ece, 2020. [Online; Accessed April
14, 2020].
[120] J. W. Sonn, “Coronavirus: South Koreas success in controlling disease
is due to its acceptance of surveillance.” https://theconversation.com/
coronavirus-south-koreas-success-in-controlling-disease-is-due-to-its-acceptance-of-surveillance-134068,
2020. [Online; Accessed April 14, 2020].
[121] Ministry of Health, Singapore Government, “Tracetogether app.” https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg,
March 2020. [Accessed June 4, 2020].
[122] National Informatics Centre, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India,
“Aarogya Setu Mobile App.” https://www.mygov.in/aarogya-setu-app/, 2020. [Accessed May 31,
2020].
[123] R. Raskar, I. Schunemann, R. Barbar, K. Vilcans, J. Gray, P. Vepakomma, S. Kapa, A. Nuzzo, R. Gupta,
A. Berke, D. Greenwood, C. Keegan, S. Kanaparti, R. Beaudry, D. Stansbury, B. B. Arcila, R. Kanaparti,
V. Pamplona, F. M. Benedetti, A. Clough, R. Das, K. Jain, K. Louisy, G. Nadeau, V. Pamplona, S. Penrod,
Y. Rajaee, A. Singh, G. Storm, and J. Werner, “Apps Gone Rogue: Maintaining Personal Privacy in an
Epidemic.” https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.08567.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed June 4, 2020].
[124] R. Canetti, A. Trachtenberg, and M. Varia, “Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy
to Tame the Coronavirus.” https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.13670.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed June 4,
2020].
[125] N. Trieu, K. Shehata, P. Saxena, R. Shokri, and D. Song, “Epione: Lightweight Contact Tracing with
Strong Privacy.” https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13293.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed June 4, 2020].
[126] Apple Inc. and Google LLC, “Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing.” https://www.apple.com/covid19/
contacttracing, 2020. [Accessed June 4, 2020].
[127] R. Rivest, J. Callas, R. Canetti, K. Esvelt, D. K. Gillmor, Y. T. Kalai, A. Lysyanskaya, A. Norige,
R. Raskar, A. Shamir, E. Shen, I. Soibelman, M. Specter, V. Teague, A. Trachtenberg, M. Varia, M. Viera,
D. Weitzner, J. Wilkinson, and M. Zissman, “The PACT protocol specification.” https://pact.mit.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf, April 2020. Ver-
sion: 0.1.
27
